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considerations of competence, enter in hiring, promoting, 
and firing. But be that as it may: duly qualified academic 
freedom is often egregiously infringed on in religiously 
based institutions. The infringements occur when the 
religious qualifications are applied unjustly: for example, 
when they are never fully stated, or not stated clearly at the 
time of appointment; when their application is arbitrary or 
irregular; or when their is no recourse available to the 
victim. 
Over the years, I have acquired a broad acquaintance with 
the religiously based colleges and universities of America. 
I have learned that the history of these institutions is 
littered with stories of unjust, often grossly unjust, 
infringements on academic freedom. The stories constitute 
a shameful blotch on the reputation of these colleges and 
universities and put into question the sincerity of those who 
profess high religious ideals for them. I defend the right of 
these colleges and universities to attach religious 
qualifications to academic freedom within their 
institutions. But I must, and will, add that all too often, 
they violate the personhood of their faculty members in the 
way they apply the qualifications. Often, the person 
violated is a brother or sister in the faith of those who 
perpetuate the violation. 
My own view, then, is that the best service the AAUP can 
continue to render to this teeming multitude of American 
institutions of higher education is to compose and 
recommend model codes of procedure for resolving issues 
of academic freedom. Almost always, it is in the 
procedure, not in the qualifications as such, that the 
injustice lies. Where there is no rule of law but only the 
command of persons, where secrecy and arbitrariness 
reign, where one never knows when and why the ax will 
fall, there justice weeps. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff is Noah Porter professor of Philosophical Theology at Yale University. 
UNEASY PARTNERS? RELIGION AND ACADEMICS 
Reprinted with permission from the January/February 2001 issue of Academe 
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As a group, religiously affiliated colleges are much like 
those with no religious connections. Some have a lot of 
money, but most get by on less. Some have wide name 
recognition; others enjoy a regional reputation or none at 
all. Some have sensitive and competent administrators 
who are on good terms with faculty, and some fall short of 
that blessed state. Some maintain high standards of 
academic excellence, but others achieve more modest (if 
not to say mediocre) levels of academic quality. 
Religiously affiliated institutions resemble their secular 
counterparts in these and other ways because they are 
subject to the same forces and circumstances that affect all 
of higher education. At the same time, however, the 
religious identity of these colleges has the potential to set 
them apart by making a distinct contribution to their 
character and quality. In the area of community life, for 
example institutional aspirations and policies are often 
explicitly linked to religious commitment or identity. 
My own college is one of twenty-eight institutions 
affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America. These colleges see lives of service, the 
integration of values and practice, and the ideals of 
character and community as essential to their identity. 
Insofar as people on campus--in or outside the religious 
tradition--value such goals, pursuing them and achieving 
them will be perceived as adding to the college's quality. 
It is .not so surprising when the religious identity of a 
college or university is taken to contribute to its 
community life, but observers of higher education seem 
less likely to view religious commitment as integral to 
academic goals. Many·people see religion and academics 
as uneasy partners, if not completely at odds. This 
inclination shows itself when we think or speak of schools 
as being pretty good academically in spite of their church 
or religious affiliation. It is only fair to note that we have 
a good deal of evidence--historical and contemporary--to 
justify such reactions. But the question is whether such a 
state of affairs must be. Are there ways in which the 
religious commitments of colleges and universities can and 
do serve their academic aspirations? 
The answer to this question is yes on several grounds. 
Take, for example, the conception of service already 
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mentioned in the context of campus life. Many church­
related colleges were founded as mission institutions--not 
in a narrowly evangelical sense, but in that of service to 
individuals and society. Service is central to the academic 
purpose of these schools. In Models of Christian Higher 
Education, Pepperdine professor of religion Richard 
Hughes identifies the ongoing theological commitment to 
service as a chief contribution to the life of the mind in 
historically Mennonite colleges--which are but one group 
of colleges among many to have such a commitment. 
Service is learning in practice, and although neither the 
practice nor the pedagogy of applied learning is exclusive 
to church-related educational communities, the religious 
commitments of such institutions straightforwardly affect 
their academic quality through their emphasis on service. 
I use the phrase "educational communities" advisedly, 
because it is plain that higher education is a communal 
activity. Even those who are inclined to view Plato's 
allegory of the cave--a tale of individual enlightenment--as 
the paradigm of true learning cannot ignore the fact that the 
story, like all of Plato's ideas, is offered in dialogue form. 
Teaching and learning take place in networks of committed 
relationships. (Plato's own academy was a religious 
community of sorts that endured for nearly a millennium.) 
Religion is certainly not the only basis for community, but 
just as certainly, it is a common one. Is religious 
commitment, particularly in what has been called the 
Hebrew-Christian tradition, as fruitful a foundation for 
academic communities as other shared commitments? 
Education theorist Parker Palmer and Mark Schwehn, dean 
of Christ College at Valparaiso University, to name just 
two, believe that it is. 
In Exiles from Eden, Schwehn emphasizes the role of 
community in knowing and, therefore, in learning. The 
intellectual life, he suggests, is inseparable from the moral 
life, and the Christian tradition, among others, nourishes 
both. The pursuit of truth, writes Schwehn, is linked 
inextricably to care taken with the lives and the thoughts of 
others. Thus, he argues, the academic life requires such 
spiritual values as humility, self-sacrifice, and charity. 
Whole-hearted acceptance of Schwehn's communitarian 
epistemology is not necessary for the purposes of the 
present argument. To whatever extent readers recognize 
the role and importance of community in higher learning, 
religious commitment can be seen to support that learning. 
INTEGRATION OF KNOWLEDGE 
At the institutional level, religious identity serves academic 
goals by providing a framework for integrating disciplinary 
pursuits and perspectives. We may be lucky enough to 
escape the extreme ideological and administrative strife 
leading to what English professors Cary Nelson and 
Stephen Watt, in Academic Keywords: A Devil's 
Dictionary for Higher Education, call entrepreneurial 
disciplinarity, which despairs of identifying any common 
institutional mission, even within disciplines. But tension 
between disciplinary specialization and integrated 
understanding is a perennial academic problem, one that is 
increasingly acute in undergraduate liberal arts colleges but 
my no means restricted to such institutions. 
Religiously affiliated colleges and universities have, it 
seems, a great advantage in addressing this problem. 
Insofar as the core claims of the affiliated religious 
tradition cut across disciplinary lines, and insofar as those 
claims are taken seriously, they provide a set of questions 
that can help to integrate the various elements of a course 
of study. (These core claims or questions serve this 
academic function for all members of the college 
community--whether they are in the affiliated religious 
tradition or not.) 
Of course, if the religious commitment of the institution 
amounts to no more than lip service, or if the core 
questions are seen as b�ing imposed on some by others or 
widely held to be irrelevant to serious scholarly inquiry, 
then this particular benefit is unlikely to result. It follows 
that the more substantive the religious commitment, the 
greater the academic benefit. Substantive religious 
commitment in an institutions means, in part, having a 
faculty and administration that take the core questions of 
the tradition seriously. Respect for these questions and 
attention to them does not imply an imposed consensus 
about their answers. In fact, having the broadest possible 
range of perspectives on the common questions would 
seem to facilitate the. integration of a course of study. And 
such integration is a hallmark of educational quality. 
ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE 
If religiously affiliated universities are the natural habitats 
for applied learning, paradigm learning communities, and 
bastions against the malaise of fragmentation and 
disciplinary disintegration, why do we find ourselves so 
suspicious of their academic potential? What explains our 
propensity to say, "They are pretty good in spite of the 
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religion"? 
I acknowledged one answer earlier: religiously committed 
institutions and individuals do not have an exemplary track 
record. Readers of these pages are as likely as anyone to 
be aware of offenses against academic excellence in the 
name of religious commitment. The offenses most often 
take the form of undermining a key principle of such 
excellence: autonomous inquiry, or academic freedom. I 
do not propose to defend religious (or any other) 
encroachments on academic freedom. Some of them--past 
and present--simply cannot be justified. 
Certain practices might be supported by the claim that 
. religious commitment serves academic goals and therefore 
may legitimately qualify academic freedom. That may 
well be so, although all such qualifications face the danger 
of becoming self-def eating at some point for academic 
institutions. But I don't wish to add to that long-standing 
discussion here. Instead, I'll suggest two ways in which 
religious commitment nurtures academic excellence by 
supporting academic freedom. My remarks focus on the 
Christian religious tradition--with which I am most 
familiar--but their application goes beyond church-related 
institutions. 
TRUTH SEEKING 
The first way in which religious commitment supports free 
inquiry is by emphasizing truth seeking. This key 
component of the Christian religious tradition 
straightforwardly allies it with the most influential modern 
thinking about free inquiry and expression. In On Liberty, 
for example, John Stuart Mill bases his defense of absolute 
freedom of expression on the value of truth and the 
imperative to seek it. 
Why isn't it obvious that religions professing to seek the 
truth, a task served by open inquiry, have a strong interest 
in academic freedom? One explanation comes 
immediately to mind: ironically, strong religious 
commitment is often suspected of being weak on academic 
inquiry precisely because of its dedication to truth. To 
profess to have the truth (as religions do, after all) is, one 
might suppose, to offer grounds for not continuing to look 
for it, or to ask questions. Such an approach has too 
commonly been characteristic of strong religious 
commitment--both in and outside the academy. 
The approach pointedly fails, of course, to take sufficient 
account of uncertainty. One can do no better here than to 
quote Mill: All silencing of discussion, he writes, is an 
assumption of infallibility. To shut of the airing of the 
alternative views on grounds that the truth is known is 
implicitly to claim certainty. But Mill's reminder about 
fallibility does not constitute an external restraint on the 
Christian religious tradition as institutionally expressed. 
The notion of human weakness--including epistemic 
weakness--is as central to the Christian tradition as any 
idea. Insofar as the possibility of being mistaken motivates 
free inquiry in the pursuit of truth, such inquiry might be 
a hallmark of the Christian tradition and its institutions of 
learning. 
So the Christian tradition--and, by extension, the learning 
institutions associated with it--has internal reasons for 
allowing free discussion, even of its own basic truth claims. 
But it is not only when people suspect they might be 
mistaken that they ought to welcome questioning; even 
confidently held true beliefs require it. Mill argues that our 
highest intellectual ideal is not simply to hold true beliefs, 
but to hold them in a certain way: 
"Even if the received opinion be ... the whole truth; unless 
it be suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and 
earnestly contested, it will...be held in the measure of a 
prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its 
rational grounds. And not only this, but...the meaning of 
the doctrine itself will be lost or enfeebled, and deprived of 
its vital effect on the character and conduct." 
The approach Mill recommends seems crucial to fostering 
active, engaged learning that will result in lives of 
informed service. If religious commitment, as I said above, 
stresses the need to seek truth, it would benefit as well 
from the rigorous free discussion Mill advocates. 
My argument that religious commitment supports academic/ 
freedom through its emphasis on truth seeking can be read 
two ways: that it does so in principle, or that it does so. in 
common practice. If read primarily in the first way, my
argument will be understood to promote free inquiry 
religious grounds. This might seem to be a bizarre sort 
preaching to the choir, since readers of Academe are, 
and large, in little need of persuasion that free inquiry is 
good idea. But active religious support for free inquiryi 
I think, more common than many people suppose--now 
in history. Even if it is not, mentioning the religi 
argument for greater academic freedom reminds us, at 
very least, that we need not choose between our religiou 
commitment and our academic ideals. 
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FOUNDATIONS FOR FREE INQUIRY 
The final point I wish to make goes one step further: 
religious commitment may be more than merely congenial 
to our academic ideals--it may be the foundation for them. 
Ideals of free inquiry and expression come to us from a 
political tradition that has, in the estimation of some, fallen 
on hard times. A core aspiration of this tradition is 
content-neutral institutional policies (those that, for 
example, treat all religions in the United States or all ideas 
in the academy equally). It is especially important, in the 
liberal tradition, for policies to be neutral about substantive 
claims of value or the nature of persons. But their need to 
be so gives rise to a certain paradox, because justifying 
liberal institutional policies requires an appeal to specific 
claims about persons and value. 
One response to this paradox has been to reject liberal 
policies--either because neutrality is impossible, or because 
the claims about the autonomy of persons that traditionally 
ground them are deemed false. But rejecting such policies 
is not an attractive option for defenders of academic 
freedom. If it's impossible to make policies that are 
neutral all the way down, the alternative is to defend 
policies that are neutral in practice on the basis of 
substantive commitments about persons and values. The 
religious commitments that give rise to the liberal tradition 
are certainly not the only basis for doing so, but they are an 
important one. 
The defense of academic freedom demands a foundation. 
Personal. and institutional religious commitment provides 
one--not uniquely, but unquestionably. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff eloquently expresses this idea in his article in 
this issue of Academe when he argues that the abridgement 
of academic freedom constitutes a profound violation of 
the person. In this world of ours, he writes, there's nothing 
of greater worth than persons, and correspondingly, no 
greater evil than the violation of persons. The violation of . 
a person is the desecration of one of the images of God. 
Injustice in the name of religion has, tragically, been as 
common inside the academy as outside of it. But to really 
make a stand in opposition to injustice, we need religion-­
or something very like it. Providing such support is 
potentially the greatest contribution of religious 
commitment to academic excellence and to the policies that 
promote and defend it. This contribution should not go 
unrecognized; nor should it be allowed to remain a mere 
possibility where it is as yet unrealized. 
torm Bailey is assistant professor of philosophy at Luther College in Decorah, Iowa. 
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